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There is now an extensive literature on the adverse effect of petroleum wealth on the political, economic
and social well-being of a country. In this study we examine whether the so-called resource curse ex-
tends to the health of children, as measured by under-five mortality. We argue that the type of revenue
available to governments in petroleum-rich countries reduces their incentive to improve child health.
Whereas the type of revenue available to governments in petroleum-poor countries encourages policies
designed to improve child health. In order to test that line of argument we employ a panel of 167
countries (all countries with populations above 250,000) for the years 1961e2011. We find robust evi-
dence that petroleum-poor countries outperform petroleum-rich countries when it comes to reducing
under-five mortality. This suggests that governments in oil abundant countries often fail to effectively
use the resource windfall at their disposal to improve child health.
© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.There is now a large literature that purports to show that pe-
troleumwealth has an adverse effect on a country's political, social,
and economic well-being. More specifically it is argued that oil and
natural gas abundance strengthens autocratic governments, un-
dermines the effectiveness of governmental institutions, increases
the likelihood of civil conflict, reinforces gender inequality, and
frustrates economic growth (Ross, 2015; van der Ploeg, 2011). This
suggests that the discovery of substantial oil and gas reserves may,
paradoxically, represent a curse rather than a blessing for a country.
In this article we examine whether the so-called resource curse
extends to the health of children, as measured by the probability of
dying between birth and age five. Child mortality provides an in-
dicator of the health status of the most vulnerable members of
society. It also provides an indicator of thewell-being of the poorest
members of society. That is because premature mortality amongst
the youngest primarily afflicts the poorest members of society (de
Looper and Lafortune, 2009; Yazbeck, 2009). Thus, child mortality
allows us to examine the impact of petroleum wealth both on the
well-being of children and, indirectly, thewell-being of the poorest.
It is also worth noting that child mortality often results from
causes that are comparatively easier and less costly to prevent or
treat (e.g. through access to clean water, oral rehydration, antibi-
otics, ante and post-natal care etc.). Of those children from around
the world that died before five years of age in 2013 51.8% died of
infectious causes, with the largest shares caused by pneumonia(14.9%), diarrhea (9.2%) and malaria (7.2%) (Liu et al., 2015). Effec-
tive interventions are available for all three diseases. That suggests
that child mortality should be responsive to public policy-making.
Moreover, it indicates that governments with access to abundant
oil revenues have more than sufficient resources to tackle child
mortality. Indeed two studies have presented evidence suggesting
that oil wealth does not adversely affect the ability of governments
to reduce child mortality (Cotet and Tsui, 2013a; Ross, 2012, pp.
196e197).
Inwhat follows we argue and present evidence in support of the
view that resource-poor countries outperform resource-rich
countries with respect to child health. We contend that the type
of revenue available to governments in resource-rich countries
reduces their incentive to improve child health. Whereas the type
of revenue available to governments in resource-poor countries,
encourages policies designed to improve child health. The non-tax
revenue available to the former means they need not seek the pro-
growth benefits that flow from improved child health. Whereas the
tax revenue that the latter depend on means they must seek the
pro-growth benefits that flow from improved child health.
In order to test that line of argument we employ a panel of 167
countries (all countries with a population greater than 250,000) for
the years 1961e2011. We find evidence that oil wealth is positively
associated with under-five mortality after controlling for poten-
tially confounding factors. This suggests that governments in oil
rich countries often fail to effectively use the resource windfall at
their disposal to improve the well-being of children and, more
S. Wigley / Social Science & Medicine 176 (2017) 142e148 143generally, the poorest. The results are robust to the inclusion of
fixed country and year effects, lags and instrumental variables to
mitigate potential endogeneity, alternative measures of oil wealth
and child health, as well as the use of multiple imputation to es-
timate missing data.
1. The paradox of plenty
Why is oil wealth a curse rather than a blessing? One of the key
reasons is that oil and gas reserves provide governments with a
source of revenue that does not require the collection of taxes from
the population at large. This increases the likelihood that political
leaders will remain in power and reduces the incentive for gov-
ernments to invest in human capital.
The standard explanation as to why oil wealth prolongs
nondemocratic rule is that hydrocarbon revenues enable autocratic
leaders to buy the support of their backers without having to
impose taxes. By contrast autocratic leaders without access to oil
revenues must levy taxes to finance the dispersal of benefits to the
regime's supporters, with the attendant risk that those who are
taxed may demand greater representation (Levi, 1989; Mahdavy,
1970). One upshot of this is that resource-poor autocracies are
more likely to transition to democracy. (Although, it should be
noted that some scholars have disputed the claim that petroleum
wealth reinforces autocratic rule; see, for example, Haber and
Menaldo, 2011; Wacziarg, 2012). For similar reasons it is argued
that access to oil revenues enhances the ability of incumbent
elected leaders to secure re-election (Goldberg et al., 2008;
Mahdavi, 2015). Thus, access to non-tax revenues enhance the
ability of autocratic and democratic leaders to stay in power. In both
cases the government can provide benefits to its supporters
without incurring the political cost of imposing taxes.
What this also means is that the survival of autocratic and
democratic leaders in resource-poor countries is dependent on
their ability to provide benefits to supporters whilst avoiding the
political cost of taxation (Bueno deMesquita and Smith, 2010). That
in turn is dependent on economic growth. Increasing government
revenue by raising new taxes is more unpopular than relying on a
combination of economic growth and unchanged or lower tax rates
to increase the tax yield. Thus, governments in resource-poor
countries have a greater incentive to invest in public goods such
as health and education that are key determinants of labor pro-
ductivity and, therefore, economic growth (Lindert, 2004). Child
health is a crucial determinant of education outcomes and, there-
fore, labor productivity. That is because disease-free children are
more likely to attend school and to learn more while they are there
(Baird et al., forthcoming; Bleakley, 2007). In addition, parents have
an increasing incentive to send their children to school as survival
rates improve (Soares, 2005). Childhood health may also have a
more direct impact on labor productivity. Maladies that are
endured during childhoodmay continue to incapacitate individuals
as they reach working age (Bleakley, 2010). Thus, the survival of
political leaders in resource-poor countries is indirectly linked to
their ability to improve the health of the youngest members of
society. Indeed, the provisioning of schooling and health care is
optimal for the political leader who lacks access to non-tax reve-
nues. Public goods that improve child health and education
appease the government's backers and generate the economic
growth that reduces the need for higher tax rates to finance those
public goods. By contrast political leaders in resource-rich countries
can rely on a source of revenue that is not dependent on howmuch
they invest in child health and education. As a result, their political
survival is less likely to be threatened by a failure to reduce child
mortality. That is to say, they are less likely to be voted out of office
(in the case of democratic leaders) or removed by revolution orcoup (in the case of autocratic leaders).
We predict, therefore, that countries that have significant oil
revenues will be less successful at reducing child mortality than
countries without significant oil revenues. While the former may
have more resources to improve child health they also have less of
an incentive to do so. This prediction is broadly in keeping with
existing research which finds that resource rich countries typically
underinvest in productive capital, such as health and education,
even though it is a key determinant of economic growth (Hamilton
et al., 2006; van der Ploeg, 2011). That finding is reinforced by
another study that found that petroleum wealth is negatively
associated with public spending on health (Cockx and Francken,
2014). However, it should be noted that the impact of public
spending on mortality and morbidity is significantly dependent on
the targeting of health-promoting resources, rather than simply the
magnitude of those resources (Filmer and Pritchett, 1999). More
explicit support for our hypothesis is provided by a study of 137
countries for the years 1990e2008 which found that petroleum
wealth is associated with a reduced capacity to prevent the spread
of HIV/AIDS (de Soysa and Gizelis, 2013).
2. Model, variables and data
In order to test the claim that oil wealth leads to higher levels of
child mortality we employ a panel of 167 countries for each year
from 1960 to 2011 to analyze the relationship between oil wealth
and childmortality. The estimationmodel takes the following form.
lnðUnder5mortalityÞitþ1 ¼ b0 þ b1lnðOil IncomeÞit þ b2lnðXÞit
þ uitþ1
(1)
Where i is the country, t is the year and X is the set of control
variables. We include country fixed-effects in order to control for
those unchanging or slow-changing factors, such as culture and
inveterately weak state capacity, which may be independently
determining oil wealth and child health. In effect this means we are
comparing each country with itself over time in order to see
whether increases in the level of oil wealth is associated with
higher levels of child mortality. In addition, we include year
dummies so as to control for the possibility of a spurious correlation
between the political variables and child mortality. That is neces-
sary given that there was a downward trend in child mortality
around the world in recent decades (Hill et al., 2012). Finally, we lag
all the independent variables by one year so as to reduce
endogeneity.
2.1. Dependent variable
Our measure of child health is the probability, per 1000 live
births, that a newborn baby will die before reaching the age of five
(Under-5 mortality). The mortality data is taken from the UN Inter-
Agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (IGME, 2016). We
prefer under-5 mortality over infant mortality because the latter is
more susceptible to undercounting, especially in poor countries
(Anthopolos and Becker, 2010). We assume that it becomes
increasingly difficult to achieve a marginal decrease in under-5
mortality as its level is lowered. Thus, in the empirical analysis
that follows we take the natural log transformation of the depen-
dent variable.
2.2. Independent variables
Our measure of natural resource wealth is the natural log (plus
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taken from the data set constructed by Ross and Mahdavi (2015).
That variable is calculated by deducting extraction costs from the
total value of a country's oil and natural gas production. This rep-
resents a more accurate measure of oil rents than oil exports
divided by GDP because it also captures oil and gas that is produced
and consumed domestically. In addition, it does not indirectly
measure the size of a country's economy or inflate themagnitude of
oil rents in poorer countries (Ross, 2012, pp. 15e16). In the latter
case this may produce a spurious correlation because oil export
dependencemay lead to higher childmortality rates or bothmay be
separately produced by the level of poverty in a country.
The fixed-effect specification that we use helps to mitigate any
omitted variable bias. Nevertheless, it is necessary to control for
those time-varying factors that might be simultaneously deter-
mining the level of oil wealth (e.g. extraction rates) as well as the
level of under-5 mortality. For that reason we include the natural
log of income (real gross domestic product per capita, in constant
2005 dollars; Heston et al., 2012), urbanization (share of population
living in urban areas; World Bank, 2016), and trade openness (total
trade as a proportion of gross domestic product; Heston et al., 2012)
to control for economic wealth, economic development, and
exposure to international competition.
We focus on petroleum wealth in this study because it domi-
nates the global market for natural resources. Petroleum by itself
accounts for approximately 90% of the global trade in minerals. In
addition, the cost of extracting oil is often significantly lower than
its market value and it can be taxedmore easily than other minerals
(Barma et al., 2011, pp. 14e15, 18). We expect, therefore, that it will
have a decisive impact on government policy in oil-producing
countries. A further reason for focusing on petroleum wealth is
that it is markedly easier to obtain reliable data on oil and gas re-
serves and production than is the case for other mineral resources
such as diamonds.
Some have argued that the incentive to discover more oil and
extract existing reserves may be higher in countries that are
autocratic, undergoing civil war, or subject to high levels of poverty
(Menaldo, 2016, pp. 66e70; Wacziarg, 2012). If correct this may
lead to spurious correlations because all three factors are also
associated with higher mortality rates among children (see, for
example, Gerring et al., 2012; Ghobarah et al., 2003). Michael Ross
argues that exploration and extraction rates are actually likely to be
lower in countries that are undemocratic, conflict ridden and
impoverished because they represent an investment risk for
extractive firms (Ross, 2015, p. 243, 2012, pp. 17e22). Nevertheless,
we take steps to control for the possibility that those factors
independently increase oil income and child mortality.
To control for level of democracy we include the polity2 index
that has been constructed by the Polity IV Project (Marshall and
Jaggers, 2016). The polity2 index is based on the extent to which
political participation is competitive, the openness and competi-
tiveness of executive recruitment, and the extent to which the chief
executive is subject to institutional constraints. Those three com-
ponents are converted into a 21-point scale for each year, with the
most autocratic countries receiving a score of 10 (e.g. Saudi Ara-
bia) and the most democratic countries receiving a score of þ10
(e.g. Norway).
To control for the impact of conflict, we include two dummy
variables indicating whether a country is undergoing a civil conflict
(internal war) or an internationalized conflict (external war). These
two variables were constructed based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed
Conflict Dataset (UCDP/PRIO, 2015).
Our control for poverty is based on the mean daily calorie intake
(in kilocalories) data that is compiled in standardized form by the
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO, 2014). The biological limiton how much a person can consume and the difficulty of hoarding
food means that increases in mean calorie intake will typically
reflect an improvement in the nutritional levels of the poor
(Blaydes and Kayser, 2011). We convert that raw data into a poverty
measure by subtracting the value for each country-year from the
maximum value in the data set. We prefer this measure of poverty
over more familiar measures such as income poverty because the
data is available for most countries in the world as far back as 1961
and is comparable across time and place. The natural log (plus one)
of this indicator of poverty, which we label as calorie shortfall, is
employed so as to render the distribution of values less skewed.
2.3. Data set
After constructing the data set we found that observations were
missing for a small proportion of country-years (see online
appendix, Table A.2.1). Deleting those cases with missing values
may deprive the model of relevant information. In addition, it may
bias the results if there is a systematic difference between the
observed and unobserved data. It may be the case, for example, that
oil rich states perform well in terms of improving child health and
yet are less likely to report health and economic data to interna-
tional agencies. This is possible because those states are typically
not dependent on foreign aid and so are less likely to heed inter-
national pressure to collect and report development data. At least
two studies have found that development data is more likely to be
missing for autocratic states (Hollyer et al., 2011; Ross, 2006). This is
relevant to the present study because of the evidence that suggests
that oil rents bolster autocratic regimes and prevent democratic
transitions. Thus, rather than applying the method of listwise
deletion, we use the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm to es-
timate the missing values (Honaker et al., 2013). Using the multiple
imputation process meant we were able to generate a balanced
panel for the 167 countries that were extant in the world from 1961
to 2011 and had populations greater than 250,000. In order to
ensure the robustness of our findings we also ran the baseline
model using the original, non-imputed, data set. Detailed variable
descriptions, descriptive statistics as well as a complete description
of the multiple imputation process can be found in the online
appendix.
3. Results
The results of our analysis are presented in Table 1. In column 1
we examine the relationship between oil rents and child health, in
the absence of any time-varying control variables. As we can see
our measure of oil rents (oil income) is positively associated with
under-5 mortality, but is not statistically significant. (It should be
noted, however, that oil income for the bivariate analysis carries the
expected sign and obtains statistically significance when we use
instrumental variables to mitigate the possibility of endogeniety;
see column 6 and below).
As we can see from column 2 the coefficient for oil income is
statistically significant and carries the expected sign when controls
are introduced for wealth, economic development and trade
openness. In columns 3 and 4 we control for the possibility that oil
wealth and under-5mortality are independently determined by the
level of democracy (polity2), conflict (internal war and external war)
and poverty (calorie shortfall). In all three cases we find that oil
income remains positively associated with under-5 mortality.
The inclusion of the various time-varying controls is necessary
in order to counter the possibility of omitted variable bias. How-
ever, GDP per capita includes oil income, and so its inclusion may
eliminate the potentially salutary effect of petroleum wealth. For
example, increases in oil income may lead to an improvement in
Table 1
Oil wealth and Under-5 mortality.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Oil income (ln) 0.0069 0.0324*** 0.0307*** 0.0227*** 0.0231*** 0.0191* 0.0455*** 0.0287*** 0.0255*** 0.0372***
(0.0078) (0.0084) (0.0082) (0.0069) (0.0087) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0076) (0.0072) (0.0108)
Tax reliance (ln) 0.2224***
(0.0831)
Polity2 0.0056** 0.0079*** 0.0073** 0.0044*** 0.0054** 0.0005 0.0031** 0.0041
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.003) (0.0008) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0026)
Internal war 0.0023 0.0088 0.0098 0.0195* 0.0025 0.0025 0.0115 0.0051
(0.0217) (0.0199) (0.0261) (0.0094) (0.0215) (0.0175) (0.0192) (0.0207)
External war 0.0426 0.0675 0.005 0.047* 0.0539 0.002 0.0487 0.0799
(0.0482) (0.0433) (0.0685) (0.0174) (0.0464) (0.0305) (0.0476) (0.0435)
Calorie shortfall (ln) 0.181***
(0.0518)
Income (ln) 0.3902*** 0.3931*** 0.3552*** 0.3527*** 0.4017*** 0.3859*** 0.1665*** 0.3566*** 0.356***
(0.0336) (0.0332) (0.0339) (0.0437) (0.0001) (0.0336) (0.0386) (0.0303) (0.0511)
Urbanization (ln) 0.276*** 0.2761*** 0.274*** 0.2844*** 0.331*** 0.254*** 0.2074** 0.2889*** 0.3553***
(0.0704) (0.0702) (0.0681) (0.0801) (0.0204) (0.0644) (0.1042) (0.0628) (0.073)
Trade openness (ln) 0.0638*** 0.0583*** 0.0635*** 0.0497 0.0566*** 0.0513** 0.0396 0.0642*** 0.0663*











Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country fixed-effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Multiple imputation ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
World region dummies ✓
Legal origin dummies ✓























Observations 8517 8517 8517 7800 1670 7348 7348 8517 5084 8517 6791
Hansen J statistic 0.49 0.35
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F
statistic
186.72 152.48
Notes: For all columns except 10 the dependent variable is the natural log of under-5 mortality. For column 10 the dependent variable is the natural log of infant mortality. The
instrumental variables for the 2SLS regressions presented in columns 6e7 are the natural log of geological endowment and out-of-region disaster. Each country-year rep-
resents a single observation except for column 5where the sample is divided into five-year panels. All right-hand side variables are lagged by one year except column 5, where
they are lagged by five years. Robust standard clustered at country level errors are reported in parenthesis. *** significant at 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
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case will largely depend on the extent to which oil wealth boosts
the income of the poorest households, where child ill-health is
more prevalent. Nevertheless, the coefficient for oil income in the
specifications that include GDP per capita should be interpreted
with caution. The coefficient for that variable whenwe set aside the
time-varying controls (Table 1, columns 1 & 6) represents the
overall average effect of oil income on under-5 mortality. As we
have already noted it carries the expected sign, but only achieves
statistical significancewhen oil income is instrumented (column 6).
Thus, we have at best weak evidence that the deleterious effect of
oil income outweighs the potentially beneficial effect of oil income.
Themost we can say, therefore, is that our evidence is consistent
with the claim that there is a causal channel through which pe-
troleum wealth has a harmful effect on child health (captured by
the coefficient for oil income in the specifications that include GDP
per capita). It remains possible that that harmful effect is at least
partially offset by the potentially salutary effect of petroleum
wealth via another causal channel that is obscured by one or more
of the time-varying controls. This leads us to the more modestclaim that resource-rich countries do not perform as well as they
should, given the windfall at their disposal. All other things being
equal, the same income increase in a resource-poor country is more
likely to be re-invested by the government in health care and ed-
ucation. In other words, resource-poor countries will typically
outperform resource-rich countries with respect to child health
because human capital formation remains more of a priority. Thus,
the results are in keeping with our hypothetical claim that gov-
ernments in countries with an abundant supply of oil and gas have
less of an incentive to reduce child mortality.4. Robustness checks
In order to ensure the robustness of our findings we examined
whether our baseline results held after various adjustments were
made to the model specification and the way in which we
measured oil rents and child health.
We have endeavored to counter the possibility of endogeniety
between oil income and under-5 mortality by lagging the right-
hand side variables by one year behind the outcome in the
S. Wigley / Social Science & Medicine 176 (2017) 142e148146baseline regressions. This provides some assurance against the
possibility of circularity between the dependent and independent
variables and the potential presence of an unmeasured (time-
varying) factor that is simultaneously determining the dependent
and independent variables. In column 5 we take this approach a
step further by dividing the sample into five year panels between
1965 and 2010 and lagging the right-hand side variables by five
years. This also allows us to examine whether oil income continues
to have a negative impact on child mortality over time. As we can
see the estimated coefficient for oil income retains the expected
sign and remains statistically significant.
In order to further address the possibility of endogeniety bias we
employed two instrumental variables for oil income. The first in-
strument is the (natural log plus one of) cumulative total oil barrels
(in million barrels of oil equivalent) associated with giant oil and
gas fields in each country. Giant oil or gas fields contain at least 500
million barrels of oil equivalent that can ultimately be recovered.
Discovering such fields is significantly easier than discovering
smaller fields, which require substantial exploratory efforts. Thus,
this represents the most exogenous (time-varying) measure of
geological endowment (Menaldo, 2016, pp. 280e281). Our data
source for this variable is Horn (2015). The second instrument uses
(the natural log of) out-oferegion natural disasters to proxy for
price increases. The underlying assumption for this variable is that
a disaster affecting an oil-producing country will increase oil prices
and, thereby, the oil income of unaffected oil-producers. This in-
strument was originally proposed and utilized by Ramsay (2011) to
examine the political resource curse. Unlike Ramsay, however, we
retain country fixed-effects so as to control for the ability of large
oil-producers to increase production in response to unexpected
interruptions to the supply of oil (Menaldo, 2016, pp. 63e64). Our
data source for this variable is Cotet and Tsui (2013b).
We estimate a 2SLS regression with country and year fixed ef-
fects, as well as robust standard errors. Both instruments, as well as
the control variables, enter the first stage of the regression as
predictors of oil income. The second stage regression estimates the
coefficient for oil income based on the first stage regression. As we
can see from columns 6 and 7 the second stage regression produces
results that are consistent with the bivariate (column 1) and
baseline regressions (column 3) (we do not report the first stage
regression for reasons of space). In addition, the Kleibergen-Paap
Wald F-stat and Hansen p-values indicate, respectively, that the
instruments are sufficiently correlated with the potentially
endogenous regressor (oil income) and that they are not directly
correlated with the dependent variable (under-5 mortality) (i.e. the
exclusion restriction is met). This suggests they are strong and valid
instruments for the independent variable of interest.
Fixed-effect specifications are crucial as they provide a way to
control for unchanging or slow changing factors (social norms,
geography, colonial history, etc.) that may be determining the
dependent variable and the main independent variables of interest,
thereby producing spurious correlations. However, that type of
specification tends to underestimate the significance of variables
that are slow changing over time. We therefore re-ran the baseline
model without country fixed-effects, but with a range of controls
for unchanging factors that may confound the results. Those time-
invariant controls are ethnic fractionalization (probability that two
randomly chosen individuals from the same population belong to
the same ethnic group; Alesina et al., 2003), landlocked (dummy
variable indicating whether a country has direct access to an open
sea), temperate (the proportion of the population living in a
temperate climate zone; Gallup et al., 2010), world region (dummy
variable based on the World Bank's classification, East Asia & Pa-
cific, Europe & Central Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, Sub-
Saharan Africa, Western), legal origin (dummy variable indicatingthe origin of each country's legal system, British, Socialist/
Communist, French, German, Scandinavian; La Porta et al., 1999),
Muslim and catholic (percentage of the population that belong to
either of those belief systems; La Porta et al., 1999). As we can see
from column 8 the results are similar to those obtained for the
fixed-effects specification.
In column 9 we examine whether our results hold for an alter-
native indicator of oil wealth. One potential shortcoming of our
default measure of oil wealth is that it covers all income from oil
and gas production and, therefore, includes income that is accrued
by privately owned companies. Thus, oil income may overstate the
revenue that each government obtains from natural resources. A
more precise measure of government revenue from natural re-
sources has recently been compiled by the International Center for
Taxation and Development (ICTD) (Prichard et al., 2014a). Based on
that data set we construct a variable that indicates the degree to
which a government's revenue is not dependent on natural re-
sources. Tax reliance is the government's revenue secured through
non-resource taxation as a share of GDP divided by total govern-
ment revenue as a share of GDP (Prichard et al., 2014b). We have
argued that governments that obtain much of their revenue from
natural resources have less of an incentive to improve the health of
children than those governments that obtain much of their revenue
from taxing economically productive activity. We expect, therefore,
that those countries that are more dependent on non-resource
taxation will be more successful at reducing child mortality. As
we can see from column 6 the natural log (plus one) of tax reliance
is, as predicted, negatively associated with under-5 mortality.
Nevertheless, we prefer to use oil income as our primary indicator of
oil wealth because data for that variable is available for more
countries and for a longer period of time (50 years as opposed to 30
years). In addition, a smaller proportion of the data for that variable
is missing (see online appendix Table A.2).
In column 10 we replace the dependent variable with an alter-
native measure of child health. Infant mortality is the probability,
per 1000 live births, that a newborn baby will die before reaching
the age of one (IGME, 2016). Reassuringly the results are consistent
with those that we obtained for under-5 mortality.
Finally we examined whether our baseline results held when
the models were estimated based on the non-imputed data set.
Reassuringly, the results are very similar the baseline estimations
suggesting that our findings are not simply an artifact of the
imputation model (see column 11). However, we prefer to rely on
the estimations that are based on the data sets that are produced by
multiple imputation because that allows us to include more infor-
mation and to avoid the possibility of selection bias (e.g. the listwise
deletion of oil-rich states that perform well with respect to
mortality-reduction or oil-poor states that perform badly with
respect to mortality-reduction).
Further robustness checks are reported in the online appendix
(Table A.3). In the appendix we firstly examine whether our re-
sults held when oil income was replaced by three indicators of
natural resource rents that have been constructed by Haber and
Menaldo (2011) up to 2006. Those indicators are total oil income
per capita (total value of petroleum produced, in 2007 dollars), total
fuel income per capita (total value of petroleum, coal and natural gas
produced, in 2007 dollars) and total resources income per capita
(total value of petroleum, coal, natural gas and metals produced, in
2007 dollars). The first indicator is similar to the measure of oil
wealth that we have used in the baseline regressions, although it
does not take into account extraction costs. The latter two in-
dicators include additional sources of natural wealth, namely coal
and metals. Reassuringly our results held whenwe employed those
alternative measures of resource wealth (Table A.3, columns 1e3).
Column 4 of Table A.3 addresses the possibility that the right and
S. Wigley / Social Science & Medicine 176 (2017) 142e148 147left hand variables of interest might lead to spurious results if they
are both highly trended. In order to control for that possibility we
included the lag of the dependent variable on the right-hand side.
Reassuringly this method for de-trending the data did not produce
results that are inconsistent with our baseline estimations. Finally,
it may be argued that our control for regime-type, polity2, is
inadequate because it does not take into account the proportion of
the population that is permitted to participate in the selection of
public officials (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002, p. 11). In order to
address that concernweweight the extent of electoral participation
based on the polity2 score. The inclusion of the revised version of
polity2 produces results that are qualitatively similar to the base-
line regressions (Table A.3, column 5).
5. Discussion and concluding remarks
Scholars have long noted that the physical geography of the
earth's surface can have a significant impact on population health,
whether directly through factors that affect disease vectors such as
climatic conditions, or indirectly through factors that influence the
economy such as soil quality and access to an open sea. In this study
we have argued that oil and gas deposits below the earth's surface
can have an impact on population health, in virtue of their influence
on government policy priorities. Paradoxically it seems that those
countries that have been gifted the resources to improve child
health are less successful at preventing child mortality.
This finding is significant given the ever-growing demand for oil,
which has resulted in an increase in the number of countries that
have become oil providers in recent years. Most of those new oil-
producing countries are poor, the very countries where child
mortality is already pronounced (Klare and Volman, 2006; Ross,
2012, pp. 26 & 30). Chad is a case in point. Oil exports from this
landlocked and poor country began in 2004. The World Bank was
heavily involved in the process as early as 2000, with the hope that
the oil windfall would be used to alleviate poverty. Despite the
efforts of international agencies infant and child mortality in Chad
actually increased slightly after 2004. Government spending on
health also increased during this time, suggesting that health-
promoting resources did not reach those that needed them the
most (Frank and Guesnet, 2009, pp. 47e48). The case of Equatorial
Guinea further illustrates the problem. The discovery of large oil
reserves during the 1990s, followed by rising oil prices during the
first decade of the new century, propelled average income in that
country to a higher level than Japan, Germany and France by 2010.
Nevertheless, it remains the case that three-quarters of the popu-
lation live below the poverty line and half the population does not
have access to clean drinking water or adequate sanitation (Wenar,
2016, p. 69).
This version of the resource curse appears to afflict most of the
14 Sub-Saharan countries that increased their oil revenues during
the first decade of the new millennium. 11 of those countries
reduced child mortality less than the average for the region as a
whole and less than the average for those countries around the
world that are in the same income group (those Sub-Saharan
countries that increased their oil income between 2000 and 2010
are Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo,
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Nigeria,
Sudan, Republic of Congo, Tanzania and Mozambique. Only the
latter three performed better than the average for the region and
their income group. See Fig. 1 in the online appendix. The income
group for each country was determined based on the World Bank's
classification - low income, lower middle-income, upper middle-
income and high income. As before we used the natural log of
under-5 mortality to calculate the drop in mortality given the
expectation that it is harder to achieve a reduction at lower initialrates). This is consistent with the findings of a recent poverty report
on Sub-Saharan Africa. The authors of that report found that, for the
period 2000e2012, healthy life expectancy (the number of years
that a newborn can expect to live in full health) was on average 4.5
years shorter in resource-rich countries in the region than other
countries in the region (Beegle et al., 2016, pp. 90e91).
The adverse effect of oil abundance on government spending
priorities represents a significant challenge for development policy.
It is difficult to see what might motivate the leaders of oil-rich
states to further invest in child health, given that their political
survival does not typically depend on the formation of human
capital. However, it should be pointed out that some oil-rich
countries have been able to reduce child mortality to a greater
extent than the average for their income group. It is noteworthy, for
example, that some countries in the Middle East, such as Saudi
Arabia, Oman, Bahrain and Qatar, that have been afflicted by the
political resource curse (i.e. entrenched autocratic rule), have
managed to achieve substantial improvements in child health.
Similarly, some oil-rich democracies, such as Norway, Brazil and
Mexico, have also been able to perform significantly better than the
average for those countries in the same income group. In the online
appendix (section 4) we examine whether the quality of govern-
ment institutions might explainwhy some countries have managed
to avoid the negative impact of oil wealth on child health. However,
those results are at best suggestive. Further research is needed in
order to ascertain those background factors and development
policies that might prevent the health resource curse.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data related to this article can be found at http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2017.01.038.
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